Getting into the Game: Legislative Bargaining, Distributive Politics, and EU Enlargement
Author: DENIZ AKSOY and JONATHAN RODDEN
Published in PFM, Vol. 9 No. 4
This paper examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are over-represented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, simple models of legislative vote-buying predict that over-represented member states will be favored in the distribution of EU transfers. We examine this proposition for each manifestation of the EC or EU since 1977 with data on agricultural, regional development, and total net transfers.
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